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The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Contracts with Annotations to
the Washington Decisions*
Chapter 3
FORMATION OF INFORMAL CONTRACTS**
Topic C. Consideration and Its Sufficiency
Section 84. APPLICATION OF RULES TO A NUMiBER OF SPECIAL
CASES.
Consideration is not insufficient because of the fact
(a) that obtaining it was not the motive or a material
cause inducing the promisor to make the promise, or
(b) that part of it does not fulfill the requirements of
sufficiency, or
(c) that the party giving the consideration is then bound
by a duty owed to the promisor or to the public, or
by any duty imposed by the law of torts or crimes,
to render some performance similar to that given or
promised if the act or forbearance given or promised
as consideration differs in any way from what was
previously due, or Q
(d) that the party giving the consideration is then bound
by a contractual or quasi-contractual duty to a third
person to perform the act or forbearance given or
promised as consideration, or
(e) that it is a promise, and a special privilege not ex-
pressly reserved in the promise but given by the law,
makes the promise or the whole agreement unen-
forceable or voidable, or
(f) that it is a promise, performance of which is condi-
tional on either a future or past event, if when the
promise is made there is any possibility, or there
would seem to a reasonable man in the position of
the promsor to be any possibility, that the prom-
ise can be performed only by some act or forbear-
ance which would be sufficient consideration.
Comment
a. The various circumstances set out in the Subsections of this
Section are specifically stated for the purpose of amplifying gen-
eral rules stated in previous Sections with reference to questions
which have most frequently raised controversy
Comment on Clause (a)
b. As it is the intent of the parties as manifested to one another
which determines whether consideration is given in exchange for
a promise, it follows that if such an intent is manifested, the
motive or the cause is immaterial.
*The absence of annotations to particular sections of the Restatement
indicates that no Washington decisions have been found on the principle
therein stated.
**Continued from last issue.
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Comment on Clause (b)
c. If something capable of operating as consideration is given,
it matters not that other things also given as consideration are in
themselves insufficient or that the exchange which the promisor
undertakes to give in return is disproportionately great, but if
part of the consideration is illegal the whole agreement may thereby
become invalid.
d. Compositions with creditors fall within this Clause. The con-
sideration for which each of the assenting creditors bargams may
be any or all of the following- 1. part payment of the sum due him,
2. the promise of each other creditor to forego a portion of has
claim, 3. forbearance (or promise thereof) by the debtor to pay the
assenting creditors more than equal proportions, 4. the action
of the debtor in securing the assent of the other creditors. Of
these, number 1 is not a sufficient consideration, but each of the
other four is sufficient. Numbers 4 and 5 are seldom bargained
for in fact, but numbers 2 and 3 are practically always bargained
for, by reasonable implication if not m express terms. Still other
considerations may be agreed upon in any case.
Comment on Clause (e), P 104.
Comment on Clause (f), P 104.
ANNOTATION
Washington decisions are in accord with this Section.
Subsection (a) Though the fact that an aged man had been supported
in the home of his daughter and son-in-law for a number of years may
not be consideration for a contract to devise property of the value of
$12,000 to the son-in-law, that circumstance may be properly taken into
account in determining whether he intended to contract to devise the prop-
erty in consideration of the son-rn-law's promise to support him for the
remainder of his life, Alexander v. Lewes, 104 Wash. 32, 42, 175 P. 572
(1918).
Subsection (b). Where a contract for the cutting, sale and delivery of
all railroad ties on certain land had been partly performed by delivery
of some of the ties contracted for and payment therefor, a promise by the
vendor to release the vendee from further liability is supported by the
promise of the vendee to accept and pay in accordance with the contract
for such ties as were then cut and release the vendor from further liability
on the contract, though the promise to pay for ties already cut is inade-
quate as consideration, LaPlante 'v. Hubbard, 125 Wash. 621, 217 P. 20
(1923) a contract to clear about seventeen acres of land in consider-
ation of the use of the same for two years is superseded by the promise
of the owner to pay $250 in consideration of the promise of the other
party to complete the clearing of the seventeen acres, clear another small
tract and surrender the unexpired term of the lease notwithstanding that
the promise to complete clearing of the seventeen acres is not good con-
sideration. Loudon v. Spencer, 84 Wash. 236, 146 P. 612 (1915), where
a steamship company, in consideration of the purchase of shares of its
stock for cash, agreed to employ the purchaser as master of its steamship
at $200 per month, and, in case he should be discharged, to repurchase, at
his option, said shares at par, the sale is absolute and can not be
avoided even if the agreement to repurchase should be ultra vzres, Olsen
v. Northern Steamship Co., 70 Wash. 493, 127 P 112 (1912).
Subsection (c) - Payment of less than the total amount of an indebted-
ness upon notes, where a part of the debt was not due, is sufficient con-
sideration for discharge of the notes, Russell & Co. v. Stevenson, 34 Wash.
166; 75 P. 627 (1904) payment of interest in advance is sufficient
sideration for an agreement to extend the time of payment of a prom-
issory note, Binnsan v. Jennzngs, 14 Wash. 677, 45 P. 302 (1906) the
giving by a judgment debtor in financial embarrassment of cash and a
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note secured by mining stock for a portion of the debt in full discharge
thereof, is a valid consideration for discharge of the debt, Brown -v.
Kern, 21 Wash. 211, 57 P.798 (1899) although a subcontractor has
contracted to do certain grubbing, represented as not exceeding ten acres,
the contractor's subsequent promise to pay additional compensation for
grubbing in excess of ten acres is based on a valid consideration, Zindorf
v. Tillotson, 83 Wash. 472, 145 P 587 (1915).
Subsection (d). While no Washington case has been found expressly
announcing the rule of this subsection, it seems to have been applied in
the case of Merchants Bank of Canada v. Sims, 122 Wash. 106, 209 P 1113
(1922) In that case a bank orally contracted with three promoters of a fish
company to extend a credit of $25,000 to the company, without guaranty, in
consideration of the promise of the promoters that the company's account
should be carried with the bank and its business there conducted. The
bank, later, refused to extend credit without a guaranty, whereupon two
of said promoters executed a guaranty which recited that it was given in
consideration of the bank "dealing" with the company. The bank then
advanced to the company amounts aggregating $14,600, but refused to
make further advances. In a suit against the guarantors it was held that
the bank's breach of contract was a valid defense to the extent that the
guarantors were damaged thereby. There was no suggestion that the guar-
anty was without consideration.
Subsection (e) A contract for the sale of goods of over the value
of fifty dollars may be enforced as against the vendor who signed a mem-
orandum thereof as required by the statute of frauds although the vendee
has not signed the memorandum and could himself avoid the contract,
Wright v. Seattle Grocery Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 P 818 (1919) a
written offer to sell land which is accepted orally may be enforced
though the acceptance may be avoided. Western Timber Co. v. Kalama
River L. Co., 42 Wash. 620, 85 P 338 (1906).
Subsection (f). A vendor's promise to sell land upon condition that
if, in a pending action, his title should be held to be defective, he should
not be under obligation to make conveyance, supports the vendee's prom-
ise to pay for the land in stated installments and to forfeit all payments
made if any installment is not paid when due, and, the vendee having
paid some installments but being in default as to others, can not recover
from the vendor payments made prior to the title being held defective in
said pending action, Jennings v. Dexter Horton & Co., 43 Wash. 301, 86 P.
576 (1906) a promise to repay a loan with interest at a stated time
upon condition that the obligation to repay shall terminate in case the
payee dies before repayment, is sufficient consideration for the loan, Comp-
ton v. Westerman, 150 Wash. 391, 273 P 524 (1928) an agreement to
sell and deliver lumber alongside steamers at sailing dates to be deter-
mined later is supported by an agreement to buy the lumber although the
buyer is to have the right to cancel the contract on account of excessive
shipping delays, Kent Lumber & Timber Co. v. Montborne Lumber Co., 150
Wash. 377, 272 P 957 (1928).
Constderations, Not Included in the Restatement, Which Are Recognized
by Washington Decisions as Sufficient.
1. Moral obligations.
The services of a broker in effecting a sale of real estate under an oral
contract of employment void under the statute of frauds creates a moral
obligation sufficient as consideration to support a written promise made
after the rendition of the services to pay the same, Muir v. Kane, 55 Wash.
131, 104 P. 153 (1909) Henneberg n. Cook, 103 Wash. 685, 175 P 313
(1918) Grant v. Ten Hope, 117 Wash. 531, 201 P. 750 (1921) White v.
Panama Lumber & Shingle Co., 129 Wash. 189, 224 P. 563 (1924). A
promise by a wife to her dying husband, at his request, to pay $10,000 to
a foster son who had rendered valuable services over a series of years to
his foster parents, but not under any express or implied contract, imposes
upon her a moral obligation to perform it which constitutes sufficient
consideration for her promise to the foster son to pay him that sum,
Olsen v. Hagan, 102 Wash. 321, 172 P 1173, 105 Wash. 698, 178 P 451
(1918, 1919).
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2. The consideration for a Contract is Sufficient to Support an Agree-
mwnt for Its Modification.
The parties to a contract for the sale of mining claims to be paid for
in installments at fixed rates, with interest only after maturity, agreed to
modify the contract by postponing the time of maturity of the remaining
installments, interest to be paid thereon after maturity as extended, the
original contract to "remain in full force and effect in every respect
except as modified by this supplemental agreement." The court said,
"there having been no default upon the original contract, the consideration
of that contract was sufficient to support the modification contained in the
supplemental agreement." The court also stated that the supplemental
contract called for performance by the purchaser of something in addition
to that which was undertaken by him in the original contract. What this
was does not appear in the opinion, Sunset Copper Co. -v. Black, 115 Wash.
132, 196 P. 640 (1921). The Supreme Court has also stated that no
new consideration as required to support an agreement modifying a con-
tract in a number of other cases in which the application of the principle
announced was not necessary to uphold a modification of contract because
there was either new and independent consideration for the modification
or the new agreement amounted merely to a waiver of conditions or an
election of one of several permissible alternative performances. Thus, in
Carstens v. Burleigh, 20 Wash. 283, 55 a 221 (1898), where performance of
a carrier's contract for the transportation of cattle was rendered im-
possible by refusal of a connecting carrier to accept them and by a strike
of the carrier's employees, it was held that an agent of the carrier could
bind it by a new contract to pay the expense of caring for and feeding the
cattle without a new consideration. (That the shipper furnished the serv-
ices in caring for the cattle, which he was not required to do by the
original contract, thus relieving the agent from the necessity of a per-
sonal supervision, would, it seems, be an adequate, independent consider-
ation for the new agreement.) An agreement by the parties to a build-
ing contract to suspend work until the building owner could raise money
with which to carry on the contract, requires no new or independent
consideration to support it, Dyer v. Middle Kittitas Irrigation District,
25 Wash. 80, 64 P. 1009 (1901). When a contract for the sale of a
large quantity of railroad ties had been partly performed, the parties
thereto mutually agreed to rescind it except as to ties that were then
cut. The court said, "we do not think it is or should be the law that any
new consideration was required to make the new agreement enforceable.
Every day in the business world men relieve one another from the per-
formance of certain agreements and it has never been thought that any
new consideration was necessary to the validity of such agreements. The
second agreement was a new contract taking the place of the first, which
had not been executed by either of the parties, and the first was a suffi-
cient consideration for the second." LaPlante v. Hubbard, 125 Wash. 621,
217 P. 20 (1923). Where a dispute arose as to the volume of flow of
water in a well located under a contract by which $500 was to be paid
for locating it, provided a flow of 250 gallons in 24 hours was obtained, a
supplemental contract providing for a test of volume at a future date
and for payment at the rate of two dollars per gallon daily flow as deter-
mined by such test, with a further provision that in case the water in the
well should be lost and no other water obtained nothing should be payable,
requires no new consideration and is supported by the consideration of
the original contract, Winn v. Stanton, 146 Wash. 328, 262 P 645 (1928).
In Hunters Cattle Co. v. Carstens Packing Co., 129 Wash. 377, 225 P
68 (1924), the court found consideration for the modification of a con-
tract in the mutual agreements of the parties to the modification and did
not resort to the consideration for the original contract. In that case
while a contract for feeding cattle for the compensation of $9 per ton
for hay fed them was still executory, an oral agreement was entered into
to modify the same by omitting a requirement therein that cut hay be fed
in tight boxes and permitting in lieu thereof the spreading of the hay to
be fed on clean snow. The court in holding the agreement not void for
want of consideration stated that "while a contract remains executory in
a substantial measure on both sides, an agreement to annul or modify on
one side is a consideration for an agreement to annul or modify on the
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other side." So, also, in Tingley v. Fasrhaven Land Co., 9 Wash. 34,
36 P 1098 (1894), where a contract for the sale of logs at $6.50 per thou-
sand delivered at purchaser's mill, was modified by a subsequent oral
agreement where the purchaser agreed to waive delivery at the mill and
the seller to accept seventy-five cents less per thousand and the purchaser
took possession, the court, after stating that the new agreement was
enforceable without the actual payment of any consideration, added that
the transaction was substantially an abrogation of the contract and was
as if, without any previous negotiations or contract, the seller had said
to the purchaser, "I will sell you my logs at six dollars and a half per
thousand feet for boomage," and the purchaser had replied, "I will take
them," and had taken possession of them. Where the parties to a build-
ing contract orally agreed, shortly after work thereunder had begun, that
the provision in the contract requiring the contractor to give notice in
writing of all claims for extra work within ten days of the beginning of
such work, should be waived and abandoned and that the contractor
should be paid for all extra labor and materials whether written notices
of such claims were given or not, the court, in response to the contention
that the new agreement was without consideration, said, "No express or
independent consideration was necessary. 'The contract, when modified
by the subsequent oral agreement, is substituted for the contract as
originally made, and the original consideration attaches to and supports
the modified contract. Thomas v. Barnes, 156 Mass. 581, 31 N. E. 683,"
(1892) Long v. Pierce County, 22 Wash. 330, 348, 61 P 142 (1900). (The
agreement recited, constituting merely a waiver of a condition in the con-
tract, would, in accordance with generally accepted principles of law and
the provisions of Section 88 of the Restatement, require no consideration.
In Stofferan, v. Depew, 79 Wash. 170, 139 P. 1084 (1914), a vendor of
soldiers' scrip, in consideration of $720 paid therefor, guaranteed in writ-
ing in case said scrip should be finally rejected and not allowed, to refund
the $720 or furnish the purchaser valid scrip in lieu thereof. Afterward
the vendor executed a second guaranty in which he agreed, in considera-
tion of the sale of said scrip, to refund the purchase price of $720 in case
the scrip should be rejected by the Department of the Interior as invalid.
The court said it was apparent "that the second agreement, as a mutual
act of the parties, was made as an amendment to, or in substitution for
the original. The substitution of a new contract for an old one in itself
constitutes a sufficient consideration," citing Long v. Pierce County, 22
Wash. 330, supra, 61 P 142 (1900). (If the second guaranty were con-
strued as a designation by the guarantor of the particular alternative per-
formance which he elected to render, it would, seemingly, require no
consideration.)
TOPIC D. INFORMAL CONTRACTS WITHOUT
ASSENT OR CONSIDERATION
Section 85. ASSENT On CONSIDERATION UNNECESSARY IN CASES
ENUMERATED IN SECTIONS 86-90.
Neither an expression of assent, unless the promise is in
terms conditional upon such an expression, nor considera-
tion is requisite for the formation of an informal contract
in the cases enumerated in Sections 86 to 90.
Comment
a. The cases referred to in this Section are exceptions to the
general rule stated in Clauses (b) and (c) of Section 19. The
requirements stated in Clauses (a) and (d) of that Section are not
affected. The limiting effect of Section 93 should also be observed.
Section 86. PROMISE TO PAY A DEBT Is BINDING THOUGH THE
DEBT Is BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
(1) Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to fulfill
all or part of an antecedent contractual or quasi-contractual
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duty for the payment of money due from the promisor,
other than a judgment, is binding if the antecedent duty
was once enforceable by direct action, and is either still so
enforceable or would be except for the effect of a statute
of limitations.
(2) The following facts operate as such a promise as that
stated in Subsection (1) unless other circumstances indicate
a different intention.
(a) A voluntary acknowledgment to the obligee, admit-
ting the present existence of such an antecedent duty
as is described in Subsection (1),
(b) A voluntary transfer of money, a negotiable instru-
ment, or other property to the obligee of such an
antecedent duty as is described in Subsection (1),
if made as interest thereon, or part payment thereof
or collateral security therefor by the obligor, or by
an agent of the obligor whose authority so to act was
not given irrevocably before the antecedent duty
was barred;
(c) A promise to the obligee of such an antecedent duty
as is described in Subsection (1) not to plead the
Statute of Limitations as a defense to an action
thereon.
(3) An executor, administrator, trustee or guardian who
makes such a promise as that stated in Subsection
(1) cannot by so doing impose a duty upon the estate
which he represents. Nor will he be personally bound
unless he was bound by the antecedent duty
comment
a. The promises included under this Section, but not the part
payments or giving of negotiable instruments or collateral security,
are required by statutes enacted in most States to be evidenced by
a signed writing in order to be operative. In a few States, how-
ever, no writing is required in any case. In a few other States
part payment or giving of security imposes no duty on a debtor
unless accompanied and characterized by a writing.
b. The antecedent duty must be for the payment of money but
it need not be for a liquidated sum and it may be under seal. An
antecedent duty under a judgment is not, however, included.
ANNOTATION
Washington decisions, except as noted below, are in accord with this
Section.
Remington's Code, Section 176, provides that "No acknowledgment
or promise shall be sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract
whereby to take the case out of the operation of this chapter (on limita-
tion of actions), unless the same is contained in some writing signed by
the party to be charged thereby- but this section shall not alter the effect
of any payment of principle or interest." A new promise, to remove
the bar of the statute, must be in writing even if the original cause of
action be regarded as consideration for the new promise, Zuhn 'v. Horst,
100 Wash. 359, 170 P. 1033 (1918)
Subsection (1). A city ordinance, creating a special fund for the pay-
ment of street improvements for which warrants had been drawn against
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a prior special fund which had become exhausted by its misappropriation,
renders the city liable to pay the warrants out of the second special
fund, although a tort action for misappropriation of the first special fund
is barred by the statute of limitations, Quaker City .Bank v. Tacoma, 27
Wash. 259, 67 P 710 (1902). A community debt, past or present, is
sufficient consideration for a joint promise of husband and wife to pay it,
Lumbermen's National Bank v. Gross, 37 Wash. 18, 79 P 470 (1905)
Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 70 Wash. 411, 140 P 328 (1914).
(The provisions of Section 85, supra, is that in such case consideration is
not necessary).
Remington's Code, Section 3416, provides that "Value is any consider-
ation sufficient to support a simple contract. An antecedent or pre-
existing debt constitutes value ' * *"
Subsection (2) (a)
Subsection (2) (b). Effect of part payment. Remington's Code, Sec.
tion 177, provides that "When any payment of principal or interest has
been or shall be made upon any existing contract, whether it be a bill of
exchange, promissory note, bond or other evidence of indebtedness, if
such payment be made after the same shall have become due, the limita-
tion shall commence from the time the last payment was made."
Payment of interest in advance tolls the running of the statute to the
time to which interest is paid, Miller v. Miller 90 Wash. 333, 156 P. 8
(1916).
Payment miust be voluntary. Where a grantee of mortgaged lands has
been compelled to redeem a portion thereof from execution sale under a
personal judgment against the mortgagor upon notes secured by the
mortgage, such involuntary payment will not operate to extend the
statute of limitations as against an action of foreclosure upon the mort-
gage indebtedness remaining unpaid, Hanna v. Kasson, 26 Wash. 568, 67
P 271 (1901) payments by an administratrix on a lawful claim against
the estate for family expenses are not voluntary and do not toll the statute
upon her separate statutory liability for family expenses, Had dad v.
Chapzn, 153 Wash. 163, 279 P. 583. (1929)
What constitutes payment. Indorsements by the payee of a note of
partial payments thereon after action on the note was barred by the
statute of limitations, are not admissible in evidence of the fact of actual
payment, Schlotfeldt v. Bull, 18 Wash. 64, 50 P 590 (1897) judgment
for the amount of an indebtedness secured by a mortgage and foreclosure
of the mortgage does not toll the statute as to parties claiming an interest
in the property who were not made parties to the foreclosure proceed-
ings, Damon v. Leque, 17 Wash. 573, 50 P. 485 (1897) Hanna v. Kasson,
26 Wash. 568, 67 P 271 (1901) There is, in effect, a cash pay-
ment sufficient to remove the bar of the statute where, at the request of
a debtor, credit was given by the creditor on the debt to the amount of an
independent debt, not barred by the statute, due to the debtor from the
creditor, the debtor promising orally to pay the balance of said account
shortly, Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Knack, 95 Wash. 339, 163
P 753 (1917). (This case seems to go beyond at least the literal pro-
visions of this Subsection which requires a "transfer of money a nego-
tiable instrument, or other property")
Transfer of property must be as nterest, part payment or collateral
security. Where delivery of property to a claimant whose claim was
barred by the statute appears to have been intended as a gift rather than
as a part payment it will not revive the claim, Pinnefl v. Copps, 149 Wash.
578, 271 P 882 (1928).
Payment must be by the obligor or hss agent. Part payment by one of
two co-obligors does not extend the period of limitations as to the other
where he did not authorize the payment or participation therein as his
own act, Perkins v. Jennings, 27 Wash. 145, 67 P 590 (1902) pay-
ments made on a promissory note by a principal do not stop the running
of the statute in favor of a surety where he has not ratified such pay-
ments, Bassett v. Thrall, 21 Wash. 231, 57 P 806 (1899) payments of
principal and interest by a husband upon a note executed by husband and
wife for a separate debt of the husband and secured by a mortgage on
community realty, will not extend the time of the running of the statute
as against the wife, Stubblefield v. McAuliff, 20 Wash. 442, 55 P 637
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(1898). But in Catlin v. Mills, 140 Wash. 1, 247 P. 1013 (1926), it is held
that a payment of interest by the husband upon the note of husband and
wife for a community debt after the statutory period of limitations has
run, revives the note as against the community by virtue of Remmgton's
Code, Sections 6892, 6893, conferring upon the husband the management
and control of the community property and making him the community
agent. Payments by a mortgagor upon a mortgage indebtedness after
conveyance of the mortgaged premises will not extend the running of the
statute against the grantee without his consent, Hanna v. Kasson, 26
Wash. 568, 67 P. 271 (1901) nor as against a judgment creditor of
the mortgager who has bought the property under execution sale, Ray-
mond v. Bales, 26 Wash. 493, 67 P. 269 (1901). Where the statute has
barred foreclosure of a mortgage, no act of the mortgagor will revive it
as against a subsequent lienholder, Devoe v. Rundle, 33 Wash. 604, 74 P.
836 (1903), nor as against a purchaser of the equity of redemption,
Damon v. Leque, 17 Wash. 573, 50 P. 485 (1897) Payments by a mort-
gagor on account of a mortgage indebtedness toll the statute of limitations
as to a prior grantee of the equity of redemption who did not record his
deed, Bode v. Rhodes, 119 Wash. 98, 204 P 802 (1922) payments on
a first mortgage by the mortgagor while in possession of and holding title
to the land after giving a second mortgage will toll the statute against
an action to foreclose the first mortgage, Hess v. State Bank of Golden-
dale, 130 Wash. 147, 226 P. 257 (1924) Where judgment on a partner-
ship note was entered against the partnership and one of the partners per-
sonally, his partial payment of the judgment will not revive the obligation
against a partner not served in the action after the statute of limitations
has run on the note in the absence of express authority to make such pay-
ment. Northern Commercial Co. v. Big Four Trading Co., 86 Wash. 589, 150
P. 1151 (1915) part payment of a note by the maker will toll the statute
of limitations as to guarantors thereof if they authorized or ratified the
payments, Van de Ven v. Overlook Mining & D. Co., 146 Wash. 332, 262 P.
981 (1928) part payment of a note by a joint maker out of his own
funds tolls the statute as to him, Old Dominion Mining Co. v. Daggett,
38 Wash. 675, 80 P. 839 (1905). Credits of partial payments do not toll
the statute unless payment was authorized or ratified by the debtor,
Arthur & Co. v. Burke, 83 Wash. 690, 145 P. 974 (1915) payment on a
joint note by one of the makers will toll the statute as to the other maker
where he knowingly permitted it to be made and afterward ratified the
application, Sanders v. Brown, 123 Wash. 611, 212 P. 1070 (1923).
A company check made for the company by an officer who was also a
joint maker of the company's note, is not thereby individually authorized
or ratified so as to toll the statute as to such officer, Farmers & Mechanics
Bank v. San Poil, etc., Co., 126 Wash. 137, 217 P. 707 (1923) pay-
ment of interest by the grantee of an equity of redemption while he held
the legal title to the land, though not personally liable for the mortgage
debt, tolls the statute of limitations for foreclosure of the mortgage, both
as to him and as to his subsequent grantees, Lihl v. Schaeffer, 134 Wash.
168, 235 P. 26 (1925) payment of interest by trustees to whom a
debtor had conveyed his property for the benefit of creditors by a trust
mortgage vesting the trustees with full authority to make extensions of
time for the payment of the indebtedness, does not toll the statute of lim-
itations, it not clearly appearing that the debtor intended that the trus-
tees should have power to do so, Berteloot v. Remillard, 130 Wash. 587, 228
P. 690 (1924).
Subsection (3). In accord with this subsection is Bank of Montreal v.
Buchanan, 32 Wash. 481, 73 P 482 (1903), holding that a community debt
of husband and wife barred by the statute of limitations after death of
the wife and appointment of the husband as her executor, would not
be made a charge against the community estate by the renewal notes of
the husband whether such notes were executed in his capacity as executor
or as survivor of the community.
NorthL Pacific Mortgage Co. v. Sie7er 146 Wash. 530, 264 P. 4 (1928),
however, holds that payments by an executor upon mortgages of the
testator not barred at the time of his decease, will toll the statute as
against devisees under a non-intervention will in which the executor was
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
directed to pay the debts and settle the estate. (This case seems con-
trary to the provisions of this Subsection. The authority conferred upon
the executor by the will to pay the debts would not, according to Sub-
section(2) (b) of Section 86, empower the executor, by a part payment,
to toll the statute as the authority to pay the debts was given irrevocably
before the antecedent duty was barred.)
Section 87 PROMISE TO PAY A DEBT DISCHARGED IN BANK
RUPTCY Is BINDING.
Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to pay all or
part of a debt of the promisor, discharged or dischargeable
in bankruptcy proceedings begun before the promise is
made, is binding.
Comment
a. In a few States only are the promises described in this Section
required to be in writing in order to be e nforceable.
ANNOTATION
A new promise, though oral, to pay a debt, made after the filing of
a petition in bankruptcy for its discharge, will revive the debt If the
promise be clear, distinct and unequivocal, Vachon v. Ditz, 114 Wash. 11,194
P 545 (1921) likewise if such promise is made after the discharge,
Parker v. Smith, 144 Wash. 24, 255 P 1026 (1927). A letter of a bank-
rupt in reply to a demand by an administrator for payment of indebted-
ness to his intestate discharged in bankruptcy stating, "regret that I can
not comply with your request. I had expected to do something of that
kind last spring but unexpected matters prevented me. * * * I have paid
quite a few of the old losses, expect to pay more, and the next one shall
be the family of my departed friend," is not sufficient to revive the debt
under the rule that the new promise must be clear, distinct and unequivo-
cal, "an expectation to pay or a present intention to pay can not be con-
strued as a promise to pay" Coe v. Rosene, 66 Wash. 73, 118 P. 881 (1913)
Brennen v. Bolotin, 148 Wash. 263 semble, 268 P 1118 (1928)
The theory of the Washington cases is that the new promise revives
the old debt. Parker v. Smith, supra.
Section 88. PROMISE TO FULFILL A DUTY IN SPITE OF NON-
PERFORMANCE OF A CONDITION Is BINDING WHEN.
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2) and in Section 93,
a promise to fulfill all or part of an antecedent conditional
duty in spite of the non-fulfillment of the condition is bind-
ing, whether the promise is made before or after the time
for fulfilling the condition, if performance of the condition
is not a substantial part of what was to have been given
in exchange for the performance of the antecedent duty,
and if the uncertainty of the happening of the condition
was not a substantial element in inducing the formation of
the contract;
(2) If a promise such as stated in Subsection (1) is
made before the time of fulfilling the condition has expired
and the condition is some performance by the promisee or
other beneficiary of the contract, the promisor can make
his duty again subject to the condition by giving notice of
his intention so to do before there has been any substantial
change of position by the promisee or beneficiary and while
there is still reasonable time to perform the condition.
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Comment
a. A promise may be conditional on receiving some performance
regarded as the equivalent of the performance in the promise, as a
promise to sell a horse if the promisee pays $500 for him. A prom-
ise may also be conditional on the happening of some event, or the
performance of some act winch is little or no part of the agreed
exchange for the performance of the promise, but fixes the time
or manner in which the promise is to be performed. In this last
class of cases a promise to disregard the condition is operative.
b. The new pronise may be made either before the time for the
performance of the condition or after that time has elapsed. If
made before the time for the happening of the condition, the new
promise naturally induces failure to perform the condition, and if
it does so the pronsor cannot assert as an excuse a failure that he
himself brought about (see Section 279). A new promise subse-
quent to the time of the happening of the condition cannot have
this effect. The failure of the condition discharges the original
duty, but the new promise subjects the promisor to a new duty, as
where an insurer promises to carry out a policy in spite of default
in some minor condition, or where a guarantor, indorser, or other
surety promises to be bound as such in spite of lack of a requisite
notice or of the creditor's failure to exercise diligence in present-
ment or in the prosecution of his claim against the principal debtor
or against the promisor himself, or in spite of variation of the duty
of the principal debtor to the creditor.
c. It is immaterial how the pronisor manifests Ins intention to
fulfil the prior duty without the performance of the condition
thereof. Whether he speaks of waiver or uses other words in this
connection is of no consequence, if the undertaking to perform
is made plain.
ANoTATION
Washington cases are in accord with this Section.
subsection (1) A provision for stipulated damages in case of failure
by defendant to plant a tract of plaintiff's land to apple trees as early in
the spring of 1912 as the weather would permit and to plant a cover crop
between the rows at the same time is waived where the plaintiff wrote
a letter to defendant on May 20th, knowing that the planting was then in
progress, that it would be satisfactory if the cover crop were planted
by September 1st, sledge v. Arcadia Orchards Go., 77 Wash. 477, 137 P.
1051 (1914). Where the agent of an insurance company promised the
Insured to indorse upon a policy in the agent's possession, consent for
removal of insured goods from one building to another the agent having
power to make such indorsement, and the goods were destroyed after
removal and before the indorsement of such consent, the insurer is
estopped from setting up the neglect of its agent to relieve itself of liabil-
ties, Henschel v. Oregon Fire, etc., Inc. Co., 4 Wash. 476, 30 P. 735 (1892)
provision in a building contract that no alterations be made in the work
therein specified except upon a written order of the architect, may be
waived by an oral agreement to pay for extra work, Gehrs v. Dawson 64
Wash. 240, 116 P. 673 (1911). A clause in a fire insurance policy that
no action on the policy shall be sustainable unless commenced within
six months after the fire, is waived by the statement of an adjuster having
apparent authority to act for the insurer, that the insurer desired to
wait until other companies having insurance upon the goods insured had
acted and that the insurer would do what the other companies did, Staats
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v. Pioneer Insurance Ass'n, 55 Wash. 51, 104 P 185 (1909). Failure to
notify a surety for a building contractor of the contractor's default within
thirty days as required in the bond of the surety is waived, when, after
receiving notice of such default the surety requested the building owner
to complete the work at the surety's expense, Eiler's Music House v. Hop-
kins, 73 Wash. 281, 131 P. 838 (1913).
Subsection (2) Where the vendor of real estate, under a contract by
which the vendee was to pay the balance of the purchase price in monthly
installments and time was of the essence of the contract, accepted several
installments after their maturity and, upon accepting payment thereafter
of several installments in advance, agreed that the vendee could make
payments of the balance of the purchase price whenever convenient and
that no advantage would be taken of the forfeiture clause, he can not for-
feit the contract for non-payment of a subsequent installment until after
demand for the installment due and the lapse of a reasonable time to meet
the demand, Whiting v. Doughton, 31 Wash. 327, 71 P 1026 (1903) Bodin
v. Wilcox, 129 Wash. 208, 224 P. 558 (1924) Cunningham v. Long, 134
Wash. 433 235 P 964 (1925).
Section 89. PROMISE TO PERFORM A VOIDABLE DUTY Is BmINING.
Except as stated in Section 93, a promise to perform all
or part of an antecedent contract of the promisor, thereto-
fore voidable by him, but not avoided prior to the making
of the promise, is binding.
Section 90. PROMISE REASONABLY INDUCINGDEFINITE AND SUB-
STANTIAL ACTION Is BINDING.
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect
to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial
character on the part of the promisee and which does induce
such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
ANNOTATION
The Washington decisions upon the rule of this Section appear to be
divided.
A subscription for the erection of a Young Men's Christian Association
building can not be avoided after work has been done or expenditure made
in reliance of the subscription, Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Olds Com-
pany, 84 Wash. 630, 147 P 406 (1915) the rule of this case is also an-
nounced in DePauw University v. Ankeny, 97 Wash. 451, 166 P. 1148(1917) and in Ellison v. Keith, 117 Wash. 648, 202 P. 241 (1921), though
in both of the cases last cited there appears to have been consideration
sufficient to support the subscriptions made. The holder of an over-
due mortgage, upon which a large amount of interest was also due, who
promised the mortgagor to remit $1,500 from the amount of the unpaid in-
terest and to reduce the rate of interest from 7 per cent to 5 per cent on
condition that the balance of the back interest be promptly paid, can not,
after the lapse of three years, assert the invalidity of the promise for
want of consideration, where the mortgagor, in reliance on the promise
made, has remained in possession of the property for three years and paid
not only the overdue interest unremitted but additional interest under
the modified agreement to the amount of more than $3,000, Hidden v.
German Savings & Loan Society, 48 Wash. 384, 93 P 660 (1908) But
in Mitchell v. Pine, 38 Wash. 691, 80 P 774 (1905), it was held that a
promise to devise land to the promisor's sister could not be enforced
after the death of the promisor although the sister, in reliance on the
promise, moved with her family from Massachusetts upon the land in
Washington and kept house for the promisor until his death, it not
appearing that any return for the promise was requested or expected,
and where lands were conveyed to a corporation as an endowment for
educational purposes, no consideration being requested or expected from
the grantee, the assumption by the grantee of an indebtedness against the
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land and the incurring of expense in conducting a school thereon would
not constitute consideration to prevent reversion of the land to the grantor
upon abandonment of the trust by the grantee, Jenkins v. Jenkins Uni-
versity, 17 Wash. 160, 49 P. 247 (1897).
Section 91. PROMISES ENU-ERATED IN SECTIONS 86-90 IF CON-
DITIONAL ARE PERFORMABLE ONLY ON H3APPENING OF CONDITION.
If a promise within the terms of Sections 86, 87, 88, 89
and 90 is m terms conditional or performable at a future
time the promisor is bound thereby, but performance be-
comes due only upon the happening of the condition or upon
the arrival of the specified time.
ANNOTATION
Where improvement warrants drawn upon a special fund were not paid
because of misappropriation of the fund, an ordinance, passed after the
right of action for the misappropriation is barred, creating a special fund
for the payment of said warrants, makes the warrants collectible, but only
out of the special fund and in accordance with the terms and conditions
of the ordinance, Quaker City National Bank v. Tacoma, 27 Wash. 259, 67
P. 710 (1902).
The rule of this Section has been applied to promises to perform con-
tracts void under the statute of frauds. Thus, the recovery of a broker
for services performed in the sale of real estate under oral contract of
employment is limited to the amount which the employer, after rendition
of the services, has promised in writing to pay-and is dependent upon all
terms and conditions of said promise, Rossea v. Rosche, 153 Wash. 54, 279
P. 80 (1929) Sirs v. Olym'pia Holding Co., 153 Wash. 254, 279 P. 575
(1929).
Section 92. To WHoM PROMISES ENUMERATIr IN SECTIONS
86-89 MUST BE MADE.
The new promise referred to in Sections 86, 87, 88 and
89 must be made to the person to whom the money is then
due, or to the promisor's surety or co-principal or indemnitor.
Comment
a. The word surety is used to include everyone who 1s bound on
an obligation, wnch as between himself and another person, also
bound to the obligee for the same performance, the latter obligor
should discharge. Thus an indorser or a guarantor is a kind of
surety
b. The promisee may be the original obligee or an assignee, and
after the new promise is made, as well as before, the right of the
promisee will be negotiable or assignable, depending on the char-
acter of the original duty and of the renewal promise.
A.NNOTATION
This section Is in accord with the following Washington cases:
A deed reciting that it is subject to a certain mortgage is not such
acknowledgment of the mortgage as to toll the statute of limitations,
Boyer v. Prce, 45 Wash. 667, 85 P. 1106 (1906) Byrnes v. Payne, 103
Wash. 260, 173 P. 1091 (1918) but payment on a promissory note to one
-with whom it was left for collection will stop the running of the statute,
Warnock v. Itauns, 38 Wash. 144, 80 P. 293 (1905).
Section 93. PROMISES ENVuMERATED IN SECTIONS 86-89 NOT
BINDING IF MADE IN IGNORANCE OF FACTS.
A promise within the terms of Sections 86, 87, 88 or 89
is not binding unless the promisor knew or had reason to
know the essential facts of the previous transaction to which
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the promise relates, but his knowledge of the legal effect of
the facts is immaterial.
Section 94. STIPULATIONS.
Agreements with reference to a proceeding pending m
court, made by attorneys representing adverse parties to the
proceeding, are not deprived of legal operation because of
lack of consideration, nor, if made in the presence of the
Court, because made orally If not made in the presence of
the Court, a writing is generally required by statute or rule
of court.
Comment
Such agreements as are within the rule stated in ths Section are
called stipulations. In some States if a stipulation is not made in
the presence of the Court, other formalities than a writing, such as
filing in court, are requisite for its validity
ANNOTATION
Washington decisions are in accord with this Section.
A stipulation to dismiss a pending personal injury case, made in writ-
ing and directed by plaintiff's attorney to the court upon being paid a
specified, agreed sum by defendant, is more than an accord and satisfac-
tion, being an agreement for final disposition of the case. The court is
bound to carry it into effect unless it should appear to him to be improper
and unconscionable, and the plaintiff is bound by it until it is properly
set aside. State ex rel. Gould v. Superor Court, 151 Wash. 413, 276 P. 98
(1929). A stipulation in a pending case may be vacated, in the discre-
tion of the court, on motion, where it was entered into under a mutual
mistake of fact, Levy v. Shehan, 3 Wash. 420, 28 P. 748 (1892). Oral
stipulations made out of court are not binding, Livesley v. Pier 9 Wash.
658, 38 P 158 (1894).*
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